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SUBJECT: BILATERALS WITH FRG ON SALT PRINCIPLES AND THEATER
SYSTEMS

REF: STATE 161659 (DTG 241911Z JUNE 78)

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1. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 26 INTERAGENCY TEAM
MET WITH FRG REPRESENTATIVES (RUTH, ROSSBACH, DAERR, VOLLSTEDT, SCHAUER AND VON
PFETTEN) FOR REVIEW OF SALT, PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III AND
PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS. US
PRESENTATION SIMILAR TO THAT SUMMARIZED IN REPORT ON FRENCH
BILATERAL JUNE 21 (REFTEL). FRG INDICATED THAT IT

--THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL US MAKE STATEMENT REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER OR NOT SOVIETS MADE A STATEMENT ON THEATER ISSUES;

--WAS OPEN ON SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURES OF FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER SYSTEMS;

--PERCEIVED IMBALANCE IN PRESENT AND FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF THEATER SYSTEMS IN US "COMMITMENT" TO DISCUSS PROTOCOL ISSUES INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES, WHILE NO COMPARABLE SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS WERE YET ON ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.

END SUMMARY.

2. ALCM LIMITS: FOLLOWING US SALT UPDATE, ROSSBACH, RUTH AND VOLLSTEDT SAID THEY HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LIMIT ON ALCMS OF RANGES GREATER THAN 600KM ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD APPLY FOR THE PERIOD OF THE TREATY. THEY ASSERTED THAT THEY HAD HERETOFORE BELIEVED ALL CRUISE MISSILE LIMITS WERE IN THE PROTOCOL. US RESPONDED THAT:

--DISTINCTION BETWEEN ALCMS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND ALCMS ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS HAD BEEN BRIEFED TO FRG AFTER THE MARCH 1977, SALT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VANCE AND GROMYKO.

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--AT THE SEPTEMBER 1977 VANCE-GROMYKO DISCUSSION, IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ALL AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 600KM WOULD COUNT AS HEAVY BOMBERS.

FURTHER, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, US EXPLAINED ITS POSITION THAT, AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL, THE 600KM RANGE LIMIT ON ALCMS ON NON-HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO NUCLEAR-ARMED ALCMS. ANY RANGE LIMIT ON CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED ALCMS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL WOULD HAVE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, UNDER THE US PROPOSAL. AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED ALCMS OF A RANGE GREATER THAN 600KM WOULD BE COUNTED AS HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE 1320 SUB-LIMIT FOR THE DURATION OF THE TREATY.

3. SALT III PRINCIPLES: AFTER BRIEFING ON PRINCIPLES FOR SALT THREE, RUTH ASKED IF REFERENCE IN PRINCIPLES THAT ISSUES INCLUDED IN PROTOCOL WOULD BE SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION IN SALT III DID NOT DE FACTO RESTRICT OPTIONS. FRG FEARS THAT AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE ON PROTOCOL ISSUES MEANS THAT US THEATER OPTIONS (E.G., CRUISE MISSILES) ARE UNAVOIDABLY LESS OPEN THAN IF THERE WERE NO SUCH PROVISION IN PRINCIPLES. AT SAME TIME, THERE IS NO SIMILAR PROVISION FOR BACKFIRE/SS-20. FURTHER RUTH SAID THAT PROVISION THAT EITHER SIDE IS FREE TO RAISE ANY QUESTION DOES NOT BALANCE THE SITUATION, SINCE THERE IS

SPECIFIC AGREEMENT THAT CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE RAISED. WHAT THEN, HE ASKED, COULD BE DONE ABOUT SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS? HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROTOCOL, LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SALT THREE WILL DEAL WITH ONLY CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND CRUISE MISSILES. NOTING THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALREADY POSED THIS POSSIBILITY TO

PAUL WARNKE, RUTH STATED THAT IT FORMED THE CENTERPIECE OF
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FRG CONCERN. FRG SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND US UNILATERAL STATEMENT, TO ASK WHETHER SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN NEW US DRAFT OF PRINCIPLES PERMITTING PARTIES TO RAISE ANY ISSUE REGARDING THE LIMITATION OF "STRATEGIC" ARMS WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO ASSERT THAT THEIR DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC" APPLIED, BARRING THE US FROM RAISING SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS, WHILE SOVIETS COULD CONTINUE TO RAISE CRUISE MISSILES. US ANSWERED THAT ITS PROPOSED USAGE OF THE WORD "STRATEGIC" "EACH PARTY WILL BE FREE TO RAISE ANY ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS" WOULD PERMIT US TO SELECT OUR DEFINITION: SHOULD WE WISH TO HAVE US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS, THE WORD COULD BE DEFINED AS REFERRING TO ALL SYSTEMS AFFECTING THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES AND SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS TARGETTED ON EUROPE. SHOULD WE NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER ARMS, THE WORD COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN CENTRAL SYSTEMS. US ALSO NOTED THAT COMBINATION OF JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE AND US UNILATERAL STATEMENT PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY WHILE AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE PERCEPTION THAT US COULD NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON US THEATER SYSTEMS IN EXCHANGE FOR LIMITS ON SOVIET CENTRAL SYSTEMS. RUTH WAS UNCONVINCED BUT SAID HE WOULD THINK IT OVER.

4. US STATEMENT: AFTER US PRESENTATION ON US PROPOSED UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, FRG ASKED IF IT WOULD BE PRESENTED WITHOUT A PREVIOUS OR PARALLEL SOVIET STATEMENT. US RESPONDED THAT THE STATEMENT MIGHT BE MADE IF THE SOVIETS MADE ONE, OR IT MIGHT BE MADE EVEN IF THE SOVIET UNION DIDN'T MAKE A STATEMENT, SIMPLY BECAUSE US SYSTEMS ARE INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL. FRG SIDE STRESSED PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE, NOTING THAT SCHMIDT HAD
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RAISED IT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH WARNKE AND WITH THE PRESIDENT, AS A MATTER OF RIGHTING IMBALANCE BETWEEN DIRECT INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN PROTOCOL AND NON-INCLUSION OF SS-20/BACKFIRE. FURTHER, RUTH ARGUED ALLEGED EFFECTS

OF THIS IMBALANCE ("A PROBLEM OF QUITE ESSENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE") ON EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE.
STATING THAT FRG UNTIL NOW HAD SUPPORTED US CONTENTION THAT CRUISE MISSILE QUESTIONS WERE OPEN AFTER PROTOCOL, "BOTH TECHNICALLY AND POLITICALLY," FRG SIDE ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION WAS NOT NOW OPEN TO THE EXTENT THAT CRUISE MIS-SILES WILL BE NEGOTIATED. IF WE DON'T SAY THAT SYSTEMS ON THE OTHER SIDE HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED ALONG WITH SYSTEMS ON OUR SIDE, WHETHER OR NOT SOVIETS MAKE STATEMENT, WE RUN THE RISK OF FORECLOSING OPTIONS ON OUR SIDE AND LOSING NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.
S RESPONDED THAT

--CRUISE MISSILE OPTION IS OPEN;

--WE CAN EITHER MAKE OR NOT MAKE OUR STATEMENT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SOVIETS SAY ANYTHING ON THE SUBJECT;

--DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE MEAN US HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF UK AND FRENCH VIEWS, AS WELL AS FRG VIEWS.

--WHILE PRINCIPLES ARE AN AGENDA OF NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES FOR SALT THREE, THEY ARE BY NO MEANS EXCLUSIVE; UNILATERAL STATEMENT IS A SUBSTANTIVE POINT WHICH KEEPS OPTIONS OPEN;

--USG UNDERSTANDS POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY FRG TO THIS ISSUE. USG AND ALLIES HAVE NOT YET REACHED CONSENSUS ON QUESTION OF HANDLING THEATER SYSTEMS; UNILATERAL STATEMENT LAYS DOWN MARKER FOR SOVIETS AND SERVES AS A WARNING, BUT NOT AN INVITATION.

--FRG DESIRE TO HAVE STATEMENT TABLED WITHOUT REGARD TO SECRET

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SOVIET MOVES WOULD BE CONVEYED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, BUT US NOTED THAT EVEN IF STATEMENT WERE NOT MADE WE ARE FREE TO RAISE ANY ISSUE WE WANT, AND WOULD NOT LOSE NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. RE POSSIBLE PREJUDICIAL PRECEDENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROTOCOL INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES, US PROGRAM, POLITICAL AND NEGOTIATING INTERESTS MEAN THAT SIMPLE EXTENSION OF PROTOCOL LIMITS NOT IN THE CARDS.

IN FURTHER COMMENTS ON US STATEMENT FRG NOTED:

ITS LACK OF INTEREST IN MULTILATERALIZING NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS;

--BELIEF THAT SOVIET SYSTEMS OF "COMPARABLE SIGNIFICANCE" SHOULD BE DIRECTLY ADDRESSED IN US STATEMENT;

--NEED TO AVOID CREATING THE NOTION OF A SERIES OF EQUILI-

BRIA IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, TO AVOID INDICATING EUROPEAN ISOLATION AND PROVIDING OPENING FOR SOVIETS. AS ONE SUGGESTION, RUTH RECAST US PROPOSED STATEMENT TO READ: "ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF A MEDIUM RANGE SHOULD BE ACCCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS IN SOVIET SYSTEMS OF A MEDIUM RANGE."

5. US NOTED THAT SOVIETS PRESENTLY APPEAR INTERESTED IN GREY AREA NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH (SINCE THEY DEAL WITH A SYSTEM, CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH DOES NOT YET EXIST) SOVIET PREFERENCE MIGHT BE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT BALANCE OF THEATER SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO AVOID COMPETITION AND TO ENHANCE STABILITY. IF CONVERSATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS WERE TO GET SERIOUS, THEY MIGHT GO BEYOND SS-20/CRUISE

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MISSILE TRADEOFFS. ASKED FOR ITS SENSE OF SOVIET THINKING, FRG SIDE NOTED "CONTINUED SOVIET INTEREST IN CO-DETERMINING THE DEFENSE POSTURE OF NATO AND EUROPE," CITING SOVIET DESIRE TO CONTROL ERW AND CRUISE MISSILES AS PRIMARY EXAMPLES. RUTH NOTED THAT SOVIETS PRESUMABLY WOULD TRY TO GET ONLY MUTUAL LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES, AS THEY DID ON ERW. US NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REASON FOR THE ALLIANCE TO AGREE TO SUCH LIMITS, JUST AS THERE HAD BEEN

NO REASON FOR THE WEST TO AGREE WITH SOVIET-PROPOSED MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF ERW.

6. US ASKED IF FRG THINKING HAD GOTTEN TO THE POINT OF CONSIDERING SPECIFIC TRADEOFFS, FOR EXAMPLE STOPPING SS-20 PRODUCTION IN RETURN FOR CURRENT GLCM/SLCM LIMITS; OR BALANCING THE SS-20 AGAINST OTHER THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS). RUTH SAID THAT THE FRG HAD NOT YET REACHED THIS POINT ALTHOUGH VOLLSTEDT MADE GENERAL POINT THAT LIMITS OF THIS SORT WOULD BE FAR LESS "LUCRATIVE" FOR SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS SINCE LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES ARE THE ONLY TECHNICALLY AVAILABLE WEAPONS TO SHIFT TO A LONGER-RANGE TNF MIX. ASKED IF THAT CONCLUSION WOULD BENEFIT OVER-ALL NATO DEFENSES, VOLLSTEDT REMARKED THAT PROBLEM WAS, FOR THE MOMENT, ONE OF TECHNICAL AVAILABILITY. ASKED FOR SPECIFICS IN THE EVENT THAT 1500-2000KM GLCMS WERE DETERMINED TO BE INTERESTING, VOLLSTEDT SUGGESTED THAT A REASONABLE TRADEOFF MIGHT BE NO FURTHER BUILDUP IN THE SS-20 FORCE. RUTH ADDED THAT CONTROL OF THE TRADEOFFS WOULD BE ONE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A SELECTIVE APPROACH. ASKED IF ALLIANCE MIGHT BE BETTER OFF NOT SEEKING CONSTRAINTS AT ALL, RUTH RESPONDED THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO CHOOSE NOT TO TALK ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES AND IRBMS, BUT FORMER CATEGORY OF WEAPONS IS ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED.

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7. CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE: FRG STRESSED NEED TO REACH COMMON ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON CRUISE MISSILE AND OVERALL THEATER SYSTEMS ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, AND TO CLARIFY DIFFERENCE WITH UK AND FRANCE ON SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. US NOTED HLG WAS ON GOING ATTEMPT TO ANALYSE OUR MILITARY NEEDS, WHILE INFORMAL PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS THIS FALL WOULD CONSIDER ARMS CONTROL ASPECT OF THEATER QUESTION. US WOULD PREFER THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS NOT BE TIED INTO NATO AT TOO EARLY A STAGE, NOTING THAT WE NEEDED TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE AND THAT THERE COULD BE PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH. FRG SAID IT WAS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN INFORMAL TALKS, BUT ALSO INDICATED A DESIRE TO SEE AN ALLIANCE PROCESS DEVELOP. US ASKED WHAT FORM FRG BELIEVED CONSULTATIONS MIGHT TAKE. RUTH SAID FRG SAW ALLIANCE AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE PLACE FOR THEM ("WE ARE NOT THINKING ABOUT A SEPARATE TABLE") AND THIS IN TURN MEANT IMPROVING CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY AMONG THE ALLIES. A FIRST STEP TO THIS WOULD BE, IN THE FRG VIEW, CONTINUED AND INTENSIVE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. WHATEVER MECHANISM WERE CHOSEN FOR GETTING THE ALLIANCE INVOLVED. RUTH FELT THAT IT SHOULD ALLOW FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A

POSITION AND SHOULD ALLOW FOR CONSULTATIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD NOT NEED TO BE NEW AND MIGHT EVEN TAKE FORM OF A SERIES OF COUNCIL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS ATTENDING FROM VARIOUS CAPITALS. US EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH FRG VIEWS; US POINTED OUT THAT ANY NEW FORUM SHOULD BE AVOIDED SINCE IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO CREATE AND STAFF. IT WOULD BE BETTER, TO USE EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE NAC AND THE SPC, BUT-TRESSED WITH EXPRETS AS REQUIRED. ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF A MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT, US NOTED THAT PEOPLE

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ON DELEGATIONS WERE NOT ALL EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES. RUTH RESPONDED THAT INTENSIFIED CONSULTATION, PERHAP ALONG THE LINES OF A SALT WORKING GROUP, COULD CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES.

8. IN CONCLUSION, RUTH SAID HE SAW THREE ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED REGARDING THE UNILATERAL STATEMENT:

-- THE "ASYMMETRY" OF THE INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE PROTOCOL, AND AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ON THEM IN SALT III;

-- THE VIEWS OF THE CONGRESS WHICH WOULD WANT A CALRIFICATION SUCH AS THE PROPOSED STATEMENT IN ANY CASE DURING THE RATIFICATION PROCESS;

-- THE NECESSITY TO SATISFY THE ALLIES.

IN VIEW OF THESE POINTS, HE CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE US TO PUT THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE BY MAKING THE STATEMENT WITHOUT WAITING FOR SOVIET MOVES ON THE SUBJECT.

9. IN SUMMARIZING SESSION, US MADE FOLLOWING POINTS. RUTH DID NOT DEMUR, BUT RESERVED FRG POSITION.

-- POLITICAL REALITY IS COMPELLING BOTH IN US AND WESTERN EUROPE, AND ENSURES THAT LIMITS ON US THEATERSYSTEMS, IF ANY, AFTER END OF PROTOCOL, WILL BE MET BY APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

-- NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME, HAVING FOR YEARS RE- SISTED THE INCLUSION OF FBS IN ARMS CONTROL, WE ARE LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITIES. WE'RE NOT NECESSARILY AGAINST CHANGING OUR POLICY BUT

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WE RECOGNIZE THAT BEFORE WE OPEN THE DOOR, WE WANT TO SEE WHAT LIES BEHIND IT.

-- WHETHER WE MAKE OUR UNILATERAL STATEMENT AS A POSITIVE ACTION OR AS A REACTION MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO OUR NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

-- FRG HAS NO OBJECTION TO OUR GOING TO THE NAC IN JULY TO CLOSE OUT THE ISSUE OF THE US FORMULATION ON THEATER SYSTEMS.

-- YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE US MAKE OUR STATEMENT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS MAKE A STATEMENT.

-- YOU ARE OPEN ON THE SUBSTANCE OF FUTURE DIS- CUSSIONS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER SYSTEMS.

-- BEFORE WE MAKE COMMITMENTS, WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD ARRIVE AT AGREED SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. YOU BELIEVE THAT CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK. YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE BILATERAL AND SHOULD HAVE SOME KIND OF MULTIASTERAL BACKUP. IN THE FALL, YOU LOOK FORWARD TO FEEDING THE PRODUCT OF THE HLG INTO THE BACKUP PROCESS.

-- YOU BELIEVE THAT NO NEW FORUM IN NATO IS NEEDED
TO IMPROVE CONSULTATIONS ON
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